two more interesting pieces from the USIP
Jan. 26th, 2007 04:33 pm![[personal profile]](https://www.dreamwidth.org/img/silk/identity/user.png){kind=small}
winterbadgerScenarios for the Insurgency in Iraq
The workshops' principal finding is that U.S. goals for Iraq and the region should be reexamined and scaled back. The administration's expressed goal of "an Iraq that is peaceful, united, stable, democratic, and secure, where Iraqis have the institutions and resources they need to govern themselves justly and provide security for their country" is possible only in the very long term. Avoidance of disaster and maintenance of some modicum of political stability in Iraq are more realistic goals—but even these will be hard to achieve without new strategies and actions. [emphasis in original]
Who Are the Insurgents? Sunni Arab Rebels in Iraq
Building a profile of a typical anti-coalition Sunni Arab insurgent is a daunting task: ready demographic information about the insurgents is fragmented, and the rebels themselves are marked more by their heterogeneity than by their homogeneity. Drawing from a wide array of sources, however, we can try to piece together a view of their primary motivations for taking up arms against the U.S.-led occupation. Sunni insurgents generally claim one of three primary identity-based impetuses for their anti-American and antigovernment violence: secular/ideological, tribal, or Islamist. Further, the Islamists can be divided into two camps: moderates and radicals who might one day reach an accord with coalition forces and the Iraqi government, and ultraradical Salafi and Wahhabi Islamists with whom a rapprochement will never occur. With the exception of this Salafi and Wahhabi minority, core ex-Ba'this—some of whom are wanted for crimes against humanity—and hardened criminals, the identity and motivations of most insurgents are elastic and multifaceted.
The workshops' principal finding is that U.S. goals for Iraq and the region should be reexamined and scaled back. The administration's expressed goal of "an Iraq that is peaceful, united, stable, democratic, and secure, where Iraqis have the institutions and resources they need to govern themselves justly and provide security for their country" is possible only in the very long term. Avoidance of disaster and maintenance of some modicum of political stability in Iraq are more realistic goals—but even these will be hard to achieve without new strategies and actions. [emphasis in original]
Who Are the Insurgents? Sunni Arab Rebels in Iraq
Building a profile of a typical anti-coalition Sunni Arab insurgent is a daunting task: ready demographic information about the insurgents is fragmented, and the rebels themselves are marked more by their heterogeneity than by their homogeneity. Drawing from a wide array of sources, however, we can try to piece together a view of their primary motivations for taking up arms against the U.S.-led occupation. Sunni insurgents generally claim one of three primary identity-based impetuses for their anti-American and antigovernment violence: secular/ideological, tribal, or Islamist. Further, the Islamists can be divided into two camps: moderates and radicals who might one day reach an accord with coalition forces and the Iraqi government, and ultraradical Salafi and Wahhabi Islamists with whom a rapprochement will never occur. With the exception of this Salafi and Wahhabi minority, core ex-Ba'this—some of whom are wanted for crimes against humanity—and hardened criminals, the identity and motivations of most insurgents are elastic and multifaceted.
