There are certainly pros to attacking terrorist command and control facilities, supply centers, training areas, and recruiting locations in whatever countries they appear. Namely, that it will impair the ability of terrorists to carry out operations and reduce the numbers of terrorists available to attack people.
In most cases, we can work with governments against terrorists operating within their borders, usually by supporting them in their own efforts to get rid of the terrorists. It's better for all concerned if the national government cleans up their own house; calling on us to actually send troops in is a last resort for all concerned, as it makes us look like an invader (even if we've been invited in) and it makes the host national government look weak and dependent on us. And no matter how much better our equipment, training, and discipline may be than that of local forces (sometimes there's no difference, or very little) we are handicapped by our unfamiliarity with local geography, language, and culture.
In cases where governments are not willing to allow US forces to enter and unwilling or unable to deal with the terrorists themselves, however, we're left with the choice of doing nothing or taking action without their permission. Doing nothing is a bad option. If the country is hostile to us to begin with (e.g., Sudan) then our main concern is how to act to achieve the greatest effect while losing as little as possible (hence the popularity of missile strikes--means no US troops can get killed, wounded, or captured).
If they're putative friends and allies, like Pakistan, things get really sticky. They have multiple reasons for not doing more against terrorists, but at the same time, they have all the usual reasons for wanting us not to come in and do anything. If we do nothing, terrorists can treat Pakistan as a safe haven, knowing that there are regions the Pakistani military probably won't pursue them. If we do something, the Pakistani people become more radicalised against us, the Pakistani government--already unpopular for being so close to us--is weakened further. And without local knowledge, we end up making more mistakes.
Yeah, Pakistan is a sticky situation. The national government has plausible deniability that they are in anyway helping the terrorists in the mountains, but they also are not being very effective in combatting said terrorists, nor cooperating with NATO forces in taking care of that problem for them.
The harder we push them to do something; the more difficulty they have in holding onto power, and a change of regime would probably not be good news for Westerners at all there. If we take action on our own, and get caught doing it; the same results are very likely. Pakistan is essentially a dry powder keg waiting for a spark...
My impression from reading press reports and books about Pakistan is that the Army is doing what it can, from time to time, to fight the *foreign* insurgents in the tribal areas, but that how hard they go at them depends on political infighting *inside* the army between those who want to crush the terrorists, those who support them, and those who don't particularly support them but find them to be a useful tool and don't want to make them go away entirely.
The situation seems to be complicated by the existence of the extremist *native* guerrilla movement, which is in some ways separate and some ways intertwined with the foreign fighters. The ethnic and religious divisions crosscut the national divisions--many Talibs and their Pakistani hosts are ethnically Pashtun and so have connections on both sides of the border. Many of the religious extremists are Deobandis and so have connections throughout the region.
And of course the terrain makes military operations there very, very difficult. The British really never mastered this area even when they controlled India, and punitive expeditions int he hundreds of thousands sometimes had trouble getting in and then getting back out again.
And, of course, any time that the government tries to push hard against the terrs after we have been pressing them to, they look like tools of the Americans and thus provide fuel to the arguments of the radicals...
no subject
Date: 2008-09-12 03:58 pm (UTC)In most cases, we can work with governments against terrorists operating within their borders, usually by supporting them in their own efforts to get rid of the terrorists. It's better for all concerned if the national government cleans up their own house; calling on us to actually send troops in is a last resort for all concerned, as it makes us look like an invader (even if we've been invited in) and it makes the host national government look weak and dependent on us. And no matter how much better our equipment, training, and discipline may be than that of local forces (sometimes there's no difference, or very little) we are handicapped by our unfamiliarity with local geography, language, and culture.
In cases where governments are not willing to allow US forces to enter and unwilling or unable to deal with the terrorists themselves, however, we're left with the choice of doing nothing or taking action without their permission. Doing nothing is a bad option. If the country is hostile to us to begin with (e.g., Sudan) then our main concern is how to act to achieve the greatest effect while losing as little as possible (hence the popularity of missile strikes--means no US troops can get killed, wounded, or captured).
If they're putative friends and allies, like Pakistan, things get really sticky. They have multiple reasons for not doing more against terrorists, but at the same time, they have all the usual reasons for wanting us not to come in and do anything. If we do nothing, terrorists can treat Pakistan as a safe haven, knowing that there are regions the Pakistani military probably won't pursue them. If we do something, the Pakistani people become more radicalised against us, the Pakistani government--already unpopular for being so close to us--is weakened further. And without local knowledge, we end up making more mistakes.
no subject
Date: 2008-09-12 08:45 pm (UTC)The harder we push them to do something; the more difficulty they have in holding onto power, and a change of regime would probably not be good news for Westerners at all there. If we take action on our own, and get caught doing it; the same results are very likely. Pakistan is essentially a dry powder keg waiting for a spark...
no subject
Date: 2008-09-12 09:45 pm (UTC)My impression from reading press reports and books about Pakistan is that the Army is doing what it can, from time to time, to fight the *foreign* insurgents in the tribal areas, but that how hard they go at them depends on political infighting *inside* the army between those who want to crush the terrorists, those who support them, and those who don't particularly support them but find them to be a useful tool and don't want to make them go away entirely.
The situation seems to be complicated by the existence of the extremist *native* guerrilla movement, which is in some ways separate and some ways intertwined with the foreign fighters. The ethnic and religious divisions crosscut the national divisions--many Talibs and their Pakistani hosts are ethnically Pashtun and so have connections on both sides of the border. Many of the religious extremists are Deobandis and so have connections throughout the region.
And of course the terrain makes military operations there very, very difficult. The British really never mastered this area even when they controlled India, and punitive expeditions int he hundreds of thousands sometimes had trouble getting in and then getting back out again.
And, of course, any time that the government tries to push hard against the terrs after we have been pressing them to, they look like tools of the Americans and thus provide fuel to the arguments of the radicals...